State v. Kubat Appellant\u27s Brief Dckt. 41675 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
10-6-2014
State v. Kubat Appellant's Brief Dckt. 41675
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"State v. Kubat Appellant's Brief Dckt. 41675" (2014). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 5048.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/5048
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 






COREY KUBAT, ) 
) 
Defendant-Appellant. ) __________ ) 
NO. 41675 
Canyon Co. CR 2013-2280 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF CANYON 
GREG S. SILVEY 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 565 




HONORABLE MOLLY J. HUSKEY 
District Judge 
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P.O. Box 83720 




TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................... ii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............................................................................... 1 
Nature of the Case ..................................................................................... 1 
Course of Proceedings ............................................................................... 1 
Statement of the Facts ............................................................................... 2 
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL ....................................................................... 6 
ARGUMENT ......................................................................................................... 7 
The District Court erred in allowing a defense witness to be 
impeached with a misdemeanor conviction for possession 
of drug paraphernalia ..................................................................................... 7 
A. Standard of review ................................................................................ 7 
B. The evidence, argument and the court's ruling ..................................... 7 
C. The court erred by allowing the witness to be impeached 
by a prior misdemeanor ...................................................................... 10 
CONCLUSION .................................................................................................... 14 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING ............................................................................... 15 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Ramirez v. State, 119 Idaho 1037 (Ct.App. 1991) .............................................. 11 
State v. Anderson, 145 Idaho 99, 175 P.3d 788 (2008) ........................................ 7 
State v. Bergerud, 155 Idaho 705 (Ct.App. 2014) ............................................... 13 
State v. Hochrein, 154 Idaho 993 (Ct.App. 2013) ................................................. 7 
Other 
1.R.E. 608 ............................................................................................................ 13 
1.R.E. 609 ......................................................................................... 8, 10-11,13 
ii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Appellant Corey Kubat (hereinafter Mr. Kubat and/or Appellant) appeals 
following a jury trial from a conviction for felony possession of methamphetamine 
with the intent to deliver, as well as misdemeanor convictions for possession of 
drug paraphernalia and injury to a child. 
Appellant asserts that the district court erred in allowing a defense witness 
to be impeached with her misdemeanor conviction for possession of drug 
paraphernalia in direct violation of I.RE. 609. 
Course of Proceedings 
Mr. Kubat was charged by criminal complaint (and later information) with 
felony possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine) with the intent 
to deliver. (R. p. 8-9, 15-16.) He was also charged by citation with misdemeanor 
injury to a child and misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia. (R. p. 19-
20.) 
Mr. Kubat pied guilty pursuant to a binding Rule 11 plea agreement, which 
the court ultimately rejected, so it was withdrawn. (R. p. 41.) The information 
was then amended to charge persistent violator. (R. p. 49.) 
The case proceeded to jury trial, where the jury found him guilty as 
charged. (R. p. 67-68.) Mr. Kubat then entered an admission to the persistent 
violator allegation. (R. p. 68.) 
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On the charge of possession of a controlled substance with intent to 
deliver as enhanced by the persistent violator, the court sentenced Mr. Kubat to 
18 years with the first eight years fixed. (R. p. 76, 84.) He was sentenced to 180 
days in jail with credit for 272 days served on both the possession of drug 
paraphernalia count and on the injury to child count. (Sentencing Tr. 10/28/2013, 
p. 23.) 
Mr. Kubat timely appeals. (R. p. 85.) 
Statement of the Facts 
While this matter was the subject of a jury trial, the official version of the 
facts from the PSI generally describes the evidence in this case and will be used 
for background. The PSI explained the facts as follows: 
On January 30, 2013, BLM Officer Whitworth, Canyon County 
Deputies, and Wilder Police Chief Tveidt responded to 22013 
Boehner Road, Caldwell, to assist District 3 Probation/Parole 
Officer Babcock. Officer Babcock had conducted a home visit on a 
parolee, Corey Kubat. When a child opened the door for Officer 
Babcock, she observed two females, later identified as Joann Gil 
(DOB  and Julie Hoffman, exit the room. Corey's 
girlfriend, Joann, told Officer Babcock that Corey was not home. 
However, Corey emerged from the utility room and attempted to 
flee out the back door. Officer Babcock apprehended Corey and 
placed him in handcuffs. Joann's two minor grandchildren were in 
the home. 
Officers searched the premises. The residence was in disarray, 
with dog feces on the utility room floor. Officer Whitworth had his 
drug detection dog, and reported he found what appeared to be 
illegal drugs in the utility room. Deputy Zechman noticed a plastic 
baggie with nine individual wrappings of a white crystal substance 
on a desk in the utility room. The crystal substance later tested 
presumptively positive for methamphetamine, for a total package 
weight of 16.8 grams. Two glass pipes with burnt residue and a 
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propane torch were also located in the utility room. Another plastic 
baggie and $436.00 in currency were found on the kitchen counter. 
PSI, p. 3. 
To further detail the relevant trial evidence, Officer Babcock testified that 
Joann Gil came out of a bedroom (not the utility room as stated in the PSI) in the 
back of the house. (Tr. p. 129.) This bedroom was near the back door, which was 
open about four inches. (Tr. p. 129.) Joann Gil came out of the bedroom and 
shut the door, and when asked, said Julie (Mr. Kubat's ex-wife) was also in the 
bedroom. (Tr. p. 129) Julie came out, and after she was searched, left the 
residence. (Tr. p. 130.) 
After Julie came out of the bedroom, Officer Babcock was alerted by 
another officer (Whitworth) that Mr. Kubat was coming from the back area of the 
house. (Tr. p. 132.) Officer Babcock testified that the back door was still ajar in 
the same position. (Tr. p. 132-133.) Officer Babcock testified that she had asked 
Joann Gil where Mr. Kubat was, and she said he wasn't there, but when Mr. 
Kubat arrived, he said he had been out chopping wood. (Tr. p. 131.) 
Officer Whitworth testified that he was standing there watching Officer 
Babcock talk to the two females when he happened to look toward the back of 
the house and Mr. Kubat was standing there. (Tr. p. 146-147.) He didn't hear a 
door open and the back door, which he also said was ajar, did not appear to 
have been moved. (Tr. p. 147.) 
Detective Salazar testified that he was requested to go to the house and 
interview Mr. Kubat. (Tr. p. 160.) Detective Salazar testified that Mr. Kubat told 
him that he knew the drugs were in the house, and when asked if Joann Gil knew 
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anything about it, Mr. Kubat said that she did not know of him buying or selling 
methamphetamine. (Tr. p. 161-162.) Detective Salazar testified that Joann Gil 
admitted to him that she had used (methamphetamine) approximately three days 
prior to that day, and was hiding it from Mr. Kubat. (Tr. p. 172.) She also stated 
that she didn't know the drugs were there. (Tr. p. 172.) 
Joann Gil testified for the defense. She testified that on the date in 
question, she and Julie Hoffman, Mr. Kubat's ex-wife, were in the back room 
which is by the utility room, which is in turn by the back door. (Tr. p. 238.) They 
were smoking a cigarette in the back room because Joann Gil does not smoke in 
front of her grandchildren and it was too cold to go outside. (Tr. p. 239) 
Joann Gil testified that after Officer Babcock had her and Julie Hoffman 
come out of the back room and were talking with her in the dining room, that the 
other officer said "hey, Corey, come here for a minute." (Tr. p. 244.) Officer 
Babcock said "I thought you said he wasn't there," and both Joann and Julie said 
he wasn't, and must have come back without them knowing. (Tr. p. 244.) 
Joann Gil testified that she was unaware of any methamphetamine in the 
house. (Tr. p. 247.) Joann Gil testified that at no time that day when she was in 
that room with Julie Hoffman was Mr. Kubat with them. (Tr. p. 255.) She said he 
had left that morning to go get wood for the house and just she and Julie 
Hoffman were there. (Tr. p. 255.) 
The next portion of Joann Gil's testimony will only be summarized here 
because it is explained in greater detail below. On cross-examination by the 
state, Ms. Gil was asked whether she saw any pipes used for smoking 
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methamphetamine when she was in the back room. (Tr. p. 268.) After an off the 
record discussion with her attorney, she answered "no." (Tr. p. 268-269.) 
The prosecutor then showed her a picture which showed a blue pipe, but 
she testified that it was not sitting there that day. (Tr. p. 269-270.) On redirect she 
agreed that the blue pipe could have been placed there after she had left the room. 
(Tr. p. 272.) 
Then, after objections and argument outside the presence of the jury, the 
court allowed the prosecutor to impeach the witness with the fact that she had pied 
guilty to misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia based on the paraphernalia 
found in the house that day. (Tr. p. 273-278.) 
The defense rested after this, and the state had no rebuttal. (Tr. p. 278-
279.) 
The jury found Mr. Kubat guilty of felony possession of methamphetamine 
with the intent to deliver, as well as misdemeanor possession of drug 
paraphernalia and misdemeanor injury to a child. 
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ISSUE 
WHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING A DEFENSE 
WITNESS TO BE IMPEACHED WITH A MISDEMEANOR CONVICTION FOR 
POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA 
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ARGUMENT 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING A DEFENSE WITNESS TO BE 
IMPEACHED WITH A MISDEMEANOR CONVICTION FOR POSSESSION OF 
DRUG PARAPHERNALIA 
A. Standard of review 
The interpretation of a statute resolves questions of law over which this 
Court exercises de novo review. State v. Anderson, 145 Idaho 99, 103, 175 P.3d 
788, 792 (2008). 
The Court of Appeals explained as follows in State v. Hochrein, 154 Idaho 
993 (Ct. App. 2013): 
When interpreting a rule of evidence, Idaho appellate courts apply 
the same standards of construction as are utilized with statutes. 
State v. Trejo, 132 Idaho 872, 878, 979 P.2d 1230, 1236 (Ct. App. 
1999). We begin with an examination of the literal words of the rule 
and give the language its plain, obvious, and rational meaning. Id. 
A rule, like a statute, should be construed so that effect is given to 
its provisions and no part is rendered superfluous or insignificant. 
Id. 
Id., p. 1002. 
B. The evidence, argument, and the court's ruling 
While being cross-examined by the state, Ms. Gil was asked whether she 
saw any pipes used for smoking methamphetamine when she was in the back 
room. (Tr. p. 268.) After an off the record discussion with her attorney, she 
answered "no." (Tr. p. 268-269.) 
When shown some photo exhibits showing the top of a desk in the back 
room, Ms. Gil testified that the blue pipe was not sitting there that day. (Tr. p. 269-
7 
270.) She also testified that she was not in any of the desk drawers that day, and 
cannot say if Julie Hoffman was or not because she had walked out of the room. 
(Tr. p. 271.) On redirect she agreed that the blue pipe could have been placed 
there after she had left the room. (Tr. p. 272.) 
Then, outside of the presence of the jury, the prosecutor advised the court 
that she would like to introduce evidence that the witness had pied guilty to a 
charge of possession of drug paraphernalia possessed on that day. (Tr. p 272.) 
The prosecutor argued that it is relevant because the witness is stating that she 
didn't see the pipes in the room at that time, but pied guilty to knowing that they 
were there and what they were used for. (Tr. p. 273.) 
Defense counsel objected that it was not proper to impeach the witness with 
prior misdemeanors. (Tr. p. 273.) The court ruled that it was going to let it come in 
because asking the witness about it has opened the door at least to the fact that 
she pied guilty. (Tr. p. 274.) 
Counsel for the witness objected under I.RE. 609 because it was not a prior 
felony within 10 years. He continued by arguing the problem is that the state is 
attempting to impeach the witness through the use of a photograph that it 
introduced. Defense counsel did not open the door by having her talk about the 
paraphernalia that was found at the scene. Rather, the state produced a 
photograph and asked questions about it and now the state wants to impeach with 
the misdemeanor crime. 1 (Tr. p. 274.) 
1 While somewhat confusingly stated, the attorney's point seems to be that the 
state opened its own door and now wants to go through it. 
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The prosecutor argued that by admitting guilt to the possession of that 
paraphernalia which was found in the room that she knew it was there. "I mean, 
whether or not it's introducing the conviction or not, I think the plea of guilty is 
enough, but I think it should come in that she admitted guilt to having that in that 
room." (Tr. p. 275, Ins. 6-10.) 
Defense counsel then argued that there were actually two pipes in the room, 
and one is a green pipe in a drawer that the officer said was closed. (Tr. p. 275.) 
There is no proof or evidence that the witness had pied guilty to possession of the 
blue pipe and that is the only pipe that the prosecutor was asking her about. (Tr. p. 
275.) 
The court then ruled as follows: 
Well, I see this as not as a matter of introducing the crime to 
impeach her credibility as a whole, in other words, under 609. I 
agree she was not convicted of a felony, but she comes in here 
today and testifies that she did not know about paraphernalia in the 
room. Do I understand the testimony correctly? That's what I just 
heard. And so it seems to me it's appropriate, then, to allow the 
State to bring in the fact that she plead guilty to that there was 
paraphernalia in the room. So I am going to permit the testimony 
and we'll return the jury. 
Tr. p. 276, Ins. 2-13. 
The prosecutor then asked: 
Q. Isn't it correct that you and Mr. Kubat were both charged with 
possession of drug paraphernalia for the paraphernalia found in the 
home that day? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And isn't it also correct that you plead guilty to that charge? 
A. Yes. 
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Tr. p. 277, Ins. 7-14. 
After this, on redirect, Joann Gil continued to assert that she was not 
aware that the blue pipe was in the residence that day. (Tr. p. 278.) 
C. The court erred by allowing the witness to be impeached by a prior 
misdemeanor 
Idaho Rule of Evidence 609 provides as follows in full: 
Rule 609. Impeachment by evidence of conviction of crime. 
(a) General rule. 
For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence of 
the fact that the witness has been convicted of a felony and the 
nature of the felony shall be admitted if elicited from the witness or 
established by public record, but only if the court determines in a 
hearing outside the presence of the jury that the fact of the prior 
conviction or the nature of the prior conviction, or both, are relevant 
to the credibility of the witness and that the probative value of 
admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the party 
offering the witness. If the evidence of the fact of a prior felony 
conviction, but not the nature of the conviction, is admitted for the 
purpose of impeachment of a party to the action or proceeding, the 
party shall have the option to present evidence of the nature of the 
conviction, but evidence of the circumstances of the conviction shall 
not be admissible. 
(b) Time limit. 
Evidence of a conviction under this rule is not admissible if a period 
of more than ten years has elapsed since the date of the conviction 
or of the release of the witness from the confinement imposed for 
that conviction, whichever is the later date, unless the court 
determines, in the interests of justice, that the probative value of the 
conviction supported by specific facts and circumstances 
substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect. However, evidence of 
a conviction more than 10 years old as calculated herein is not 
admissible unless the proponent gives to the adverse party 
sufficient advance written notice of intent to use such evidence to 
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provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to contest the use 
of such evidence. 
(c) Withheld or vacated judgment; pardon for innocence. 
Evidence of a withheld judgment or a vacated judgment shall not be 
admitted as a conviction. Nor shall a conviction that has been the 
subject of a pardon, annulment or other equivalent procedure 
based on a finding of innocence be admissible under this rule. 
(d) Pardon, annulment or certificate of rehabilitation not based on 
innocence; pendency of an appeal. 
If the conviction has been the subject of a pardon, annulment or 
certificate of rehabilitation or other equivalent procedure not based 
on a finding of innocence, or is the subject of a pending appeal, the 
evidence of a conviction is not rendered inadmissible, but shall be 
considered by the court in determining admissibility. Evidence of 
the pardon, annulment, certificate of rehabilitation or other 
equivalent procedure, or pendency of an appeal is admissible if 
evidence of the conviction is admitted. 
1.R.E. 609. 
The plain language of the rule provides that only felony convictions can be 
used for impeachment. In fact, the Court of Appeals has directly held this. "Rule 
609 only allows felony convictions to be used for impeachment purposes." 
Ramirez v. State, 119 Idaho 1037, 1040 (Ct. App. 1991). 
Here, the prior conviction was for a misdemeanor, not a felony, so the 
court's ruling is in direct contravention of the rule and is erroneous. As will be 
explained below, since the court erred and the error is not harmless, the 
convictions must be reversed. 
First, however, a few additional points will be made. To begin with, it is 
beside the point that the prosecutor only wanted the fact of the guilty plea 
admitted, rather than the conviction. The rule does not provide for that 
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distinction, rather, the only thing that can impeach a witness is a conviction, it 
does not allow impeachment by the fact of a guilty plea. Nor could the rule do so 
without it essentially rendering itself a nullity. In other words, if impeachment by 
a guilty plea, as opposed to a conviction, was exempt from the rule, then any 
witness who happened to have pied guilty to any crime whatsoever at any time 
could be impeached by it, which is clearly not what the rule intends. 
Second, while there may well have been a proper way to impeach the 
witness, the prosecutor did not suggest the proper way and the court did not rule 
on such a request. 
Since impeachment with a prior misdemeanor is so obviously prohibited 
by the rule, given the court's comment about the crime not being introduced to 
impeach the witness's credibility as a whole, it appears that what the court was 
really trying to allow was impeachment with a prior inconsistent statement. 
In other words, assuming the witness actually admitted to a factual basis 
for possession of paraphernalia in her change of plea hearing, that admission 
could presumably be elicited, but without reference to Ms. Gil's guilty plea (i.e. 
by referring only to a prior proceeding). However, the convictions cannot be 
simply affirmed under the theory of right result, wrong reason, because proper 
impeachment of the witness would not have introduced the guilty 
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plea/conviction, which is still prohibited by I.RE. 609.2 
Finally, as mentioned above, the error is not harmless. As the Court of 
Appeals explained in State v. Bergerud, 155 Idaho 705 (Ct.App. 2014): 
Where defendants have shown trial error, reversal is appropriate 
unless the appellate court is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the violation did not contribute to the jury's verdict. State v. 
Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227-28, 245 P.3d 961, 979-80 (2010). An 
error will be deemed harmless if the court is able to say beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the result of the trial would have been the 
same if the error had not occurred. State v. Almaraz, 154 Idaho 
584, 598, 301 P.3d 242, 256 (2013). 
Id., p. 712. 
The error in our case cannot be considered harmless. While it is the 
state's burden to prove the error harmless, Appellant will nevertheless point out 
that Joann Gil's credibility was crucial to the defense case. In other words, if the 
jury believed Joann Gil's testimony that Mr. Kubat had not been in the back room 
that day, and/or that she had not seen the methamphetamine or blue pipe there 
that day, the jury could have acquitted Mr. Kubat. 
2 This is confirmed in State v. Bergerud, 155 Idaho 705 (Ct.App. 2014), where 
the defense was not allowed to impeach a state's witness with his prior 
misdemeanor conviction for providing false information to a police officer. The 
Court of Appeals held that the defense should have been allowed to cross 
examine him under I.RE. 608(b) because the specific instance of the witness's 
conduct (lying to police) is probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness. However, 
the Court of Appeals noted that if the witness denied having lied to police, this 
does not mean that the defense would necessarily be allowed to ask him about 
the misdemeanor conviction and instead suggested that the examiner would 
have to "take his answer." 
Incidentally, I.RE. 608(b) does not apply to our case because there is nothing 
about the witness's prior conduct, to wit, possession of paraphernalia, that is 
probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Kubat requests this Court reverse and vacate his conviction for felony 
possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver and misd~meanor 
convictions for possession of drug paraphernalia and injury to a c 
,,, k 
DATED this&-.:- day of October, 2014. 
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